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Among	the	most	important	questions	awaiting	the	next	Iraqi	government	will	be	how	to	rein	in	public	sector
spending	while	simultaneously	addressing	the	needs	of	2.5	million	unemployed	Iraqis	who	urgently	require	jobs.
With	the	national	unemployment	rate	currently	at	16	percent,	there	is	consensus	within	policymaking	circles	that	job
creation	needs	to	focus	on	the	private	sector	rather	than	continuing	to	increase	public	employment.	But	short	of
securing	major	foreign	investment	in	the	country,	tackling	high	levels	of	youth	unemployment	–	estimated	at	36%	–
without	further	expanding	the	public	sector	wage	bill	will	be	extremely	difficult	in	the	near	term.
One	approach	is	to	look	at	where	major	downsizing	in	unproductive	state	entities	can	quickly	occur,	to	reduce
inflated	operating	costs	caused	by	overstaffing	in	order	to	create	space	for	job	creation	in	productive	sectors.
Among	the	biggest	black	holes	within	Iraqi	public	sector	spending	are	the	state-owned	enterprises	(SOE).	Because
they	are	considered	self-financing	entities,	they	are	not	incorporated	into	the	annual	federal	budget,	despite	the	fact
that	they	are	largely	unprofitable	and	depend	on	soft	loans	from	state-owned	banks	and	special	grants	from	the
government	budget	in	order	to	cover	essential	spending	including	salaries.
Official	data	from	2015	suggests	that	there	is	a	total	of	176	SOEs	nationwide,	although	several	have	merged	in
recent	years.	As	of	2013,	only	44	SOEs	were	profitable	and	this	number	has	likely	fallen	since	the	collapse	of	oil
prices	in	2014.	One	of	the	major	problems	with	lack	of	transparency	is	that	publicly	available	employment	numbers
for	the	SOEs	are	scarce.	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	line	ministries	and	other	state	entities,	whose	employment	figures
are	published	on	an	annual	basis	within	the	federal	budget.	Data	from	2010	suggests	that	there	were	633,000	SOE
employees	(including	contractors	and	daily	wage	earners)	and	this	has	likely	increased	since	then.
The	legal	basis	for	SOEs	is	largely	governed	by	the	Public	Companies’	Law	no.	22	of	1997,	which	has	been
amended	five	times,	most	recently	in	2015.	Ownership	of	SOEs	falls	to	14	ministries,	including	the	Ministry	of
Industry	and	Minerals,	the	Ministry	of	Electricity,	the	Ministry	of	Oil	and	the	Ministry	of	Finance.
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Data	from	2015	on	a	selection	of	136	SOEs	shows	that	their	total	expenditure	had	peaked	in	2013	to	$31.3	billion.
By	2015,	spending	had	been	cut	by	$6	billion	but	less	than	a	quarter	of	those	SOEs	were	making	a	profit.	By
comparison,	spending	on	salaries	and	wages	was	$4.5	billion	in	2013,	and	only	decreased	to	$4.4	billion	in	2015,
with	wages	averaging	just	over	$900	per	month.	There	was	an	8.4%	decline	in	permanent	employees	between
2013	and	2015,	while	the	number	of	daily	wage	earners	was	slashed	by	43.4%	over	the	same	period.
	 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total	salaries	and	wages	(million	USD) 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.4
Total	number	of	permanent	employees 354,713 366,944 348,122 336,041
Total	number	of	contractual	employees 33,066 41,463 41,269 43,836
Total	number	of	daily	wage	earners 31,733 34,187 26,814 19,333
Total	revenues	(billion	USD) 24.9 27.5 26.9 22.0
Total	expenditures	(billion	USD) 27.7 31.3 29.2 25.0
Data	from	136	SOEs.	Source:	Government	of	Iraq/World	Bank
A	closer	look	at	the	SOEs	owned	by	the	Ministry	of	Defence	is	illustrative	of	the	broader	problem.	Out	of	the	6
companies,	only	one,	known	as	Hamurabi,	has	any	degree	of	productive	capacity	–	manufacturing	small	arms	such
as	hand	pistols.	All	6	companies	are	unprofitable,	lack	basic	infrastructure,	and	are	wholly	unfit	to	compete	in	a
modern	market.	Despite	the	fact	that	over	$800	million	has	been	spent	on	salaries	and	wages	for	over	20,000
employees	since	2003,	the	rationale	for	maintaining	these	failing	SOEs	is	quite	simple:	they	serve	a	public	good
through	employment	generation,	and	any	previous	attempts	to	downsize	or	liquidate	the	entities	have	been
perceived	as	politically	risky.
But	a	2015	government	strategy	formulated	by	the	Prime	Minister’s	Advisory	Committee	(PMAC)	reiterates	the
need	for	a	major	overhaul	that	downsizes	SOEs,	transfers	employees	to	their	corresponding	line	ministries,
establishes	training	centers	to	build	capacity,	and	liquidates	the	unsalvageable	SOEs.	The	report	also	identifies
some	181,000	employees	over	the	age	of	50	and	with	at	least	15	years	of	service	that	could	be	offered	early
retirement,	thereby	cutting	the	workforce	by	over	one	quarter.
Clauses	within	Law	22	can	be	invoked	to	immediately	liquidate	SOEs	that	have	no	potential	for	growth.	This	would
consist	of	at	least	20	SOEs	including	5	of	those	owned	by	the	Ministry	of	Defence.	Furthermore,	it	is	possible	to
reclassify	non-commercial	SOEs	so	that	they	can	be	integrated	into	the	public	wage	bill,	ensuring	greater
transparency	in	budgetary	spending.
Addressing	transparency	issues	is	a	good	place	to	start	for	any	reform	initiative.	A	number	of	good	governance
practices	can	be	adopted,	in	line	with	SOE	Good	Governance	Charter	that	was	adopted	by	cabinet	in	2017.	This
includes	publishing	aggregate	reports	on	financial	performance;	conducting	annual	third	party	independent	audits;
and	enhancing	financial	accountability	by	declaring	financial	assistance	from	the	state.	An	up-to-date	breakdown	of
employment	numbers	within	each	SOE	should	also	be	reported	as	part	of	a	comprehensive	information	system	that
also	monitors	and	records	off-budget	financing	from	state-owned	banks.
Prioritising	the	reform	of	state-owned	enterprises	has	an	added	benefit	beyond	reducing	public	sector	spending.
SOEs	are	notorious	for	creating	monopolies	and	crowding	out	private	enterprise.	By	addressing	overstaffing	issues,
many	of	these	companies	can	be	transformed	into	attractive	investment	opportunities	through	public-private
partnerships,	thereby	stimulating	private	sector	growth.	Naturally,	any	attempt	to	adopt	these	reform	measures	will
be	faced	by	popular	opposition	from	vested	interests,	so	the	next	government	will	need	to	ensure	that	it	can
convincingly	communicate	its	approach	to	the	general	public	and	illustrate	how	it	will	ultimately	lead	to	enhanced
job	prospects	over	the	long	term.
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